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How do we make medical moral judgments as practising bioethicists? 
Do we simply follow the prescriptions of law and professional codes 
of practice; do we start with the best available medical knowledge 
and act accordingly; or do we ask in the light of law and science what 
is the right thing to do? Our starting point tells us a lot about who 
we are as bioethicists. It may also highlight the problems facing the 
teaching, learning and practice of the discipline today.
Although bioethics is now a compulsory component of South 
African (SA) medical education, having previously been something 
of a ‘Cinderella’ subject in most faculties in the past, it is by no means 
clear that students, professors and professionals in healthcare know 
what to make of it, or indeed how to do it. This is at least in part due 
to the nature of bioethics’ necessarily complex mixture of philosophy, 
law and medicine – each of them disciplines that require years of 
study for mastery, and each of which is subject to its own internal 
debate. 
Most working bioethicists enter the field through one of these 
three disciplines. Although they acquire knowledge of the others, 
how they do bioethics will reflect their starting point. However, a 
philosopher will gain a working knowledge of medical law and the 
basics of medicine in order to be effective. Similarly, a lawyer will need 
to acquire broader skills in philosophy as well as jurisprudence and 
basic medicine. And a healthcare professional will need more legal 
knowledge than medical law, and to develop a solid grounding in 
philosophy. (Those who come from outside these fields – sociology, 
history or theology, for example – will have to do comprehensive 
study in all three to get on board.)
To further complicate things, within each core discipline there are 
many different approaches to the subject that sometimes compete 
and sometimes complement each other. Legal theory (jurisprudence) 
is often split between an approach that emphasises interpretation 
and application of laws, and a profound scepticism about the 
hidden or not-so-hidden interests and ideologies behind a given 
law. Health science education, too, has hidden curricula: claims 
of empirical, observable truth following a scientific experimental 
method combined with a realisation, at least since Thomas Kuhn,[1] 
that intuitions can result in paradigm shifts; and certain ideological 
worldviews about the nature of care (prevention or cure) and access 
to it (public or private health). Philosophy is even more complex, 
and to illustrate my general point let me try, through a (necessarily) 
simplified history, to illustrate the point I am making in detail.   
Philosophy is an intellectual family of subjects – epistemology, 
metaphysics, logic, politics, mind and ethics, to name a few – bound 
together by reason. Done properly, they interlink with each other: you 
cannot really reflect ethically unless you have a clear understanding 
of the nature of ethics (metaphysics) and how you know something 
is right (epistemology), based upon a coherent argument (logic). To 
further complicate matters, philosophising is often done – since the 
19th century at least – within two broad traditions that have, until 
recently, barely spoken to each other: the analytic and continental 
schools. 
This split between the traditions emerged out of a response to 
Kant’s theory of knowledge. Kant[2] (1724 - 1804) held that some 
things can be known by our experience of them (the phenomenal) 
while others cannot: they can be known only in themselves (the 
noumenal). Hegel (1770 - 1831)[3] denied the distinction, arguing 
that both subsisted within what he called the Ideal. While Hegelian 
thought in various forms dominated European philosophy (and often 
applied in theology) until the early 20th century, it was challenged 
from a variety of perspectives.
In Denmark, Kierkegaard[4] (1813 - 1855), a Lutheran theologian 
at odds with a Church he considered too conformist to his society, 
objected to Hegel’s claim that thought could be objective, insisting 
that truth was subjective – the truth of a fact (for example, a 
Christian doctrine) lies in one living it out, not simply in its logical 
coherence or reference to reality. Similarly, the German Nietzsche[5] 
(1844 - 1900) reacted against any Hegelian application of the Idea 
to religion (and against religion in general), and developed his 
own subjective theory of self-mastery (the Ubermensch). These 
ideologically divergent thinkers would form the basis for the 
20th-century existentialism of thinkers as varied as Heidegger, 
Jaspers, Sartre and Camus.[6] Together with phenomenology, 
drawn as the word implies at least in part from Kant’s idea of 
the phenomena, it would be a major component of continental 
philosophy,[7] which would expand to include the postmodern 
thinking of philosophers such as Derrida and Foucault.
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Continental philosophy’s interests generally lay – lie – within the 
‘big picture’: movements of history, the working of institutions, the 
nature of religion and belief, literature and ethics. Its breadth of scope 
often leads it into dialogue with other disciplines: history, sociology, 
theology, literature and art. Critics may well object that it is in fact 
these disciplines and not philosophy. (I remember a philosopher in 
London objecting bitterly to Kierkegaard being taught as a philosophy 
elective: ‘He’s a bloody theologian!’ he snorted.) 
These critics usually come from the analytical philosophical 
tradition,[8] which emerged as another revolt against Hegel in the 
early 20th century, mainly at the universities of Cambridge and 
Vienna. Rejecting the possibility of Kant’s noumenal and Hegel’s 
synthesis, they insisted on an epistemology based on the truth 
of evidence. Central to this, and played out in various ways, was 
the emphasis on truth claims referring to what can be objectively 
discovered. Since what many analytical philosophers prized above 
all was evidence, there was a tendency to look into the finer details 
of things, drawing heavily on logic and philosophy of language to 
establish verifiable truths. 
Quite quickly these philosophical traditions took on geographical 
associations: while continental thought dominated mainland Europe 
and Latin America, analytical philosophy had as its base Britain (and 
by extension universities in the British ‘Empire’) and North America. 
This distinction is somewhat muddied by the existence of a more 
continental tradition in religiously founded universities, notably 
Catholic universities and seminaries, where, since the Middle Ages, 
philosophy has been integrated into the study of theology.  
Within SA, faculties at historically English-speaking universities 
usually work within the analytical school, while Afrikaans universities 
more often lean towards the continental.[9] These differences, despite 
a current tendency to greater dialogue between them, and growing 
integration of philosophers in them working together in the same 
departments, affect how philosophers approach questions of 
bioethics.    
This is within what we call the Western tradition that has dominated 
academia during the centuries of European-North American global 
power. Beyond this we see a range of Eastern philosophies that have 
persisted for centuries, and now vibrant traditions emerging from 
Africa. These too are gaining traction in SA.
What does this mean for bioethics in SA today? Firstly, it is clear 
that bioethicists coming to the field primarily from philosophy are 
probably coming in with one or other of the dominant Western 
philosophical traditions. This all-too-brief account of them shows 
that differences in content and method exist, and have an effect on 
the conclusions bioethicists make. There is nothing wrong in that: 
divergent opinions are the lifeblood of academic discourse. Agreeing 
to disagree is a sign of maturity and a careful corrective to mental 
rigidity.
But, secondly, what is important is to note how this affects bio-
ethicists from other primary disciplines. Those whose fields emphasise 
objectivity, empirical data and ‘facts’ may be frustrated by such 
divergent opinions – particularly those emanating from people of 
the continental tradition. Similarly, those whose primary interest is 
to know what the law commands may question the point of such 
speculation – until of course there arises a need to change laws. At the 
very least, thirdly, we may find ourselves talking at cross-purposes. 
There is an even deeper risk: superficiality. The great English 
philosopher of history, Collingwood,[10] (1889 - 1943), warned against 
what he called ‘scissors and paste’ history. By this he meant ‘excerpting 
and combining the testimonies of different authorities’, having 
already concluded what one wanted to know about a subject. The 
mere act of cobbling together bits of ‘evidence’ (I suppose in the age 
of computers we might more accurately call the process ‘cut and 
paste’), without asking the underlying question why?, often results 
in at best a narrative, at worst a half-baked bricolage of statements. 
As a historian I agree with Collingwood that such a method is 
unsatisfactory; it is equally unhelpful in bioethics.
How many of us, I wonder, haven’t come across student essays or 
even academic papers that are little more than a string of quotes 
and a conclusion? One sees citations of laws (‘The National Health 
Act says … so …’), sweeping appeals to ethical theory (‘From the 
theory of deontology, it seems … so … ) or to principles (‘The 
principle of autonomy says … so … ) or claims based on medical 
evidence (‘From the medical fact that … so … ). My instinctive 
response to such statements is often, “So … what?” Without careful 
engagement with law – whether taking the cited law as a starting 
point and then either working through its possible application, if 
not also engaging in the background, intentions and ideological 
assumptions behind law that are central to critical legal theory – the 
conclusion is usually shallow. Without insight into the origins, internal 
controversies and critiques of a philosophical theory, its application 
is too easily facile (and certainly unsatisfactory to any professional 
philosopher). And without accepting that most medicine is based 
on best currently available evidence, often subject to ongoing and 
further experimental research, informed at times by paradigm shifts 
in thinking, one might come across as having a fixed understanding 
of science. A contemporary medical practitioner whose thought is 
rooted in Aristotelian biology would be laughed out of court by peers 
– and considered dangerous to patients.
At bottom, it is a question of academic rigour. The problem I have 
illustrated above reminds me of trying to hold water in leaky buckets. 
One can of course arrange one bucket within another (and so on, 
theoretically ad infinitum) in a sequence such that water runs out 
more slowly. It is conceivable that one might even manage, through 
careful arrangement, to minimise leakage, but the leak will remain. 
Does this mean that any ethical reflection – where law is subject to 
development or change, medical knowledge is constantly evolving 
and philosophy is almost by definition a constantly evolving set of 
arguments – is impossible?
I don’t think so. The classical-medieval philosophical and 
theological idea of probabilism offers us a way forward here.[11-13] 
Essentially a guide to making a moral judgment when conflicting 
strong arguments coexisted, probabilism describes a continuum 
of moral reasoning – from laxism at one extreme to tutiorism at 
the other. Laxism effectively suggests that one could act so long as 
one had a reason (however thin); tutiorism holds that one should 
always take the morally ‘safest’ side, usually identified with positions 
of the highest authorities (which in medieval terms meant popes 
and councils of the Catholic Church). Neither extreme position is 
intellectually satisfactory, but in-between the extremes there are 
positions that offered (and offer) a fruitful approach. Probabiliorism 
(from the Latin, ‘more likely’) argues that one should adopt a position 
that had a preponderance of evidence on its side. Equiprobabilism, 
occupying the centre of the continuum, argues that all things being 
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equal, one could take a less safe option if it was as good as, or very 
close to, the safe option. While some might see all this as medieval 
hair-splitting, what it offers makes sense to ethicists who admit that, 
in the light of limited knowledge of law, medicine and philosophy, 
the best we can do is to present provisional moral arguments as 
coherently as possible, while having the epistemological humility 
to recognise that we may not have solved a problem for all time: 
we’ve arranged our buckets together in such a way that we have 
minimised the leaks. 
Such sophistication and epistemological humility is vital for the 
further growth of SA bioethics as both an academic discipline and as 
a practice in healthcare. But, as I have argued, the level of complexity 
of its components makes the goal difficult to attain, particularly when 
they are not the sole focus of its practitioners.   
What, then, can be done?
Broader and deeper education for bioethicists is obviously 
needed. Specialised programmes of study (such as the University 
of the Witwatersrand MSc in Bioethics and Law, for example) are 
a good start, although even here there may need to be a more 
expanded curriculum. What may be needed is more jurisprudence, 
so that bioethicists understand the nature of law more fully, in 
addition to the specifics of medical law; some introduction to the 
different forms of philosophy, particularly differing epistemologies, 
in addition to ethics; and even perhaps some philosophy of science 
and the scientific method. 
Given the limits – time, resources, costs, etc. – of any formal 
programme, and given that many practising bioethicists may not 
even be able to engage in further specialised studies, the least we 
can perhaps hope for is ongoing personal study in the areas I have 
mentioned above. To make this easier, more systematic and less 
lonely, one possibility is setting up informal cross-disciplinary reading 
groups for bioethicists.
While this may seem a nuisance, I think it may be necessary. 
Bioethics is more than intellectual speculation. At bottom, it’s often 
about people’s lives. 
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